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Firms use reference points to evaluate financial performance, frame gain or loss posi-
tions, and guide strategic behavior. However, there is little theoretical underpinning to
explain how social performance is evaluated and integrated into strategic decision
making.We fill this void with new theory built on the premise that inherently ambiguous
social performance is evaluated and interpreted differently than largely clear financial
performance. We propose that firms seek to negotiate a shared social performance
reference point with stakeholders who identify with the organization and care about
social performance. While incentivized to align with the firm, firm-identified stake-
holders provide intense feedback when there are major discrepancies between their
expectations and the firm’s actual social performance. Firms frame and respond to
feedback differently depending on the feedback valence: negative feedback will be
framed as a legitimacy threat, and firm responses are likely to be substantive; positive
feedback will be framed as an efficiency threat, and firm responses are likely to be
symbolic. However, social enterprises face a double standard in evaluations and cali-
brate responses to social performance feedback differently than do nonsocial enter-
prises. Our behavioral theory of social performance advances knowledge of
organizational evaluations and responses to stakeholder feedback.
Firms use reference points to evaluate perfor-
mance and frame gain or loss positions (Cyert &
March, 1963; Shinkle, 2012). The discrepancy be-
tween a reference point and a firm’s actual per-
formance, referred to as performance feedback, is
used to guide future strategic behavior (Cyert &
March, 1963; Shinkle, 2012). A growing body of
performance feedback literature (Gavetti, Greve,
Levinthal, & Ocasio, 2012) has evaluated readily
quantifiable financial indicators, such as return
on assets (ROA; Chrisman&Patel, 2012), Altman’s
Z (Iyer & Miller, 2008), and sales (Greve, 2008),
against a firm’s own historical performance
(Greve, 1998; Massini, Lewin, &Greve, 2005) or the
performance of industry peers (Mishina, Dykes,
Block, & Pollock, 2010).
However, financial performance is not the sole
reference point for firms. Firms are increasingly
pushed to engage in societal contributions beyond
mere regulatory compliance (Filatotchev &
Nakajima, 2014; Foerstl, Azadegan, Leppelt, &
Hartmann, 2015). As a result, social performance—
voluntary business action(s) with social or third-
party effects (Schuler & Cording, 2006)—is now
squarely on the strategic agenda of contemporary
firms (Waddock, Bodwell, & Graves, 2002). As Porter
and Kramer claimed, “Social performance has
emerged as an inescapable priority for business
leaders in every country” (2006: 1).
We draw on behavioral theory of the firm and
social identity theory to build new theory capable
of explaining how firms form, frame, and respond
to social performance reference points. In doing
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so we elucidate key differences between behav-
ioral theory of the firm grounded in financial
performance and our behavioral theory of the firm
grounded in social performance. First, there are
differences regarding performance feedback for-
mation. Behavioral theory of the firm grounded in
financial performance tends to assume that firms
select their reference point, composed of a cri-
tertion and referent, and directly infer perfor-
mance feedback. For instance, a firm can
immediately recognize its position relative to a
financial reference point by comparing its ROA
(the criterion) against the industry average ROA
(the referent). In contrast, social performance
lacks clear reference points. There is little con-
sensus about how to measure the criterion of
social performance (Aguinis & Glavas, 2012;
Clarkson, 1995; Margolis & Walsh, 2003), let
alone reliable referents to use as benchmarks.
We argue that under these ambiguous conditions
firms tend to rely primarily on the expectations
of their firm-identified (FI) stakeholders—that
is, stakeholders who derive their identity from
organizational attributes (Zavyalova, Pfarrer,
Reger, & Hubbard, 2016). In particular, we sug-
gest that FI stakeholders who care about social
performance are incentivized to provide social
performance feedback since theyderive their self-
concept from the organization, and firms have
incentives to heed their feedback because of
the power and legitimacy-based salience of FI
stakeholders. We define social performance
feedback as the visible and active expression of
discrepancies between stakeholder expectations
and the firm’s actual social performance.
Second, there are differences regarding firm
framing of social performance feedback. Tradi-
tionally, firms adopt a loss frame to interpret
negative feedback, which triggers problemistic
search in order to solve the performance short-
falling (Cyert &March, 1963), whereas firms adopt
a gain frame to interpret positive feedback, which
induces strategic conservatism due to satisficing
and unwillingness to fall below the reference
point (Greve, 2003). When assessing social per-
formance, we theorize that a loss frame will
manifest as a legitimacy frame and a gain frame
will manifest as an efficiency frame. On the one
hand, in a loss position, given the threat of losing
crucial FI stakeholder support, firms will be con-
cerned about falling too far below FI stakeholder
expectations. On the other hand, in a gain posi-
tion, given the cost and the uncertain financial
benefits of social performance (Walters, Kroll, &
Wright, 2010; Wood & Jones, 1995), firms will try to
avoid undertaking social performance activities
too far above FI stakeholder expectations. As
a result, we differentiate between weak perfor-
mance feedback that results from minor discrep-
ancies with FI stakeholder expectations and
intense performance feedback that flows from
major discrepancies. We theorize that firms are
likely to respond only to intense social perfor-
mance feedback involving a critical mass of con-
sistent (negative or positive) FI stakeholder
feedback. As such, whereas behavioral theory of
the firm grounded in financial performance sug-
gests that strategic responses are most pro-
nounced close to the reference point (Cyert &
March, 1963), we theorize that firms are rather
content when close to a social performance ref-
erence point but use more marked responses
when far away from it.
Third, there are critical differences in how firms
respond to social performance feedback com-
pared to financial performance feedback. The
ambiguous nature of social performance allows
firms to enact a broader range of strategic re-
sponses to address a more malleable reference
point of stakeholder expectations. However, firms
vary significantly in the importance that they
place on social performance, which is likely to
influence how firms are evaluated and respond
to social performance feedback. We theorize
that FI stakeholders are likely to hold social
enterprises—firms for which social performance
is central to organizational identity—to higher
standards than nonsocial enterprises that do not
have social performance as central to organiza-
tional identity. Since social performance feed-
back strikes at the core of their self-concept by
generating identity threats and opportunities
(Crane & Livesey, 2003), social enterprises are
likely to enact responses that differentiate them
from nonsocial enterprises.
By integrating social performance into behav-
ioral theory of the firm, we advance existing re-
search in three primary ways. First, we address
calls to provide theoretical grounding to reference
point formation (Holmes, Bromiley, Devers,
Holcomb, & McGuire, 2011; Shinkle, 2012), espe-
cially under ambiguous conditions (Fang, Kim, &
Milliken, 2014). Rather than assuming that a ref-
erence point is a static benchmark that is selected
by the firm and sequentially adapted from year to
year (Chen, 2008; Chrisman & Patel, 2012), or an
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empirically driven weight of referents (Greve,
2003, 2007, 2008), we conceptualize reference point
formation as a negotiation between FI stake-
holder referents and an organization endowed
with a broad array of strategic responses to in-
fluence those referents.
Second, we explicate the role of identity in so-
cial performance reference point formation,
framing, and response. We theorize that FI
stakeholder identification with a firm generates
self-continuity incentives to align expectations
with the firm when discrepancies are minor
(Cooper & Fazio, 1984; Zavyalova et al., 2016), but
identity considerations of self-protection and self-
enhancement induce FI stakeholders to provide
intense—visible and active—feedback when
discrepancies are major. Further, our theory not
only contends that identity considerations impact
how stakeholders assess social performance ac-
tivities across firms with different organizational
identities but also that organizational identity
affects firm responses to performance feedback
(Bundy, Shropshire, & Buchholtz, 2013).
Third, we extend the literature on organiza-
tional evaluations by examining firm responses
to positive evaluations. Burgeoning research on
“wrongdoing” (e.g., scandals, product recalls,
boycotts) has shedvaluable insight intohow firms
respond to negative social performance feedback
with a robust repertoire of defensive measures
(McDonnell & King, 2013; Zavyalova et al., 2016).
Our theory allows us to also examine when firms
are above a social performance reference point
and specifies the risks associated with positive
social performance feedback, including social
performance investments exceeding financial ef-
ficiency (Barnett & Salomon, 2006) and increased
likelihood of future violations of stakeholder ex-
pectations (Graffin, Bundy, Porac, Wade, & Quinn,
2013;Mishina,Block,&Mannor, 2012). Indoingsowe
expound on the benefits and costs of “rightdoing.”
REFERENCE POINT FORMATION
Financial Performance Feedback
Performance feedback plays a key role in firms’
decisions to adapt their strategies (Argote &
Greve, 2007; Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 2003) as
they react to the discrepancy between a reference
point and actual performance (Cyert & March,
1963). A reference point is composed of a criterion,
which is the specific goal or outcome that is
evaluated, and a referent, which is the object of
comparison against which the firm is evaluated
(Shinkle, 2012).
In the vast majority of work examining the role
of performance feedback, scholars have used fi-
nancial performance as the criterion component
of the reference point (Gavetti et al., 2012; Shinkle,
2012). Financial performance is generally clear
and readily quantifiable. The presentation of
financial performance is institutionalized in
annual reports and business plans (Honig &
Karlsson, 2004). Furthermore, financial perfor-
mance feedback mechanisms are easily accessi-
ble. Firms can readily review their own historical
financial statements and assess their standing
within an industry (Watson, 1993), and public
companies can rely on capital markets for real-
time performance appraisals. This clear and rel-
atively quick financial performance feedback
allows firms to adapt strategies accordingly.
However, the rise of corporations engaging in
social performance activity (Porter & Kramer,
2011) makes it untenable that financial perfor-
mance is the only criterion on which firm perfor-
mance is evaluated. We explore another salient
criterion of firm performance—social performance—
and build important distinctions betweenbehavioral
theory of the firm grounded in financial performance
and our behavioral theory of the firm grounded in
social performance. Table 1 provides a summary of
these critical differences, eachofwhichweelaborate
on in the following sections.
Social Performance Feedback: An Important
Criterion Without Referents
Social performance has become an increasingly
important and expected performance criterion of
contemporary firms (Porter & Kramer, 2011; Steger,
Ionescu-Somers, & Salzmann, 2007). Today’s man-
agers are pushed to add social value, beyond that
required by regulations, and therefore tend to pur-
sue social performance alongside financial goals
(Porter & Kramer, 2006). While social performance
constitutes a critical criterion for contemporary
firms, evaluation of social performance remains
problematic because of a lack of clear, reliable, and
easily accessible referents (Table 1, row 1).
The term social performance itself has been
subject to great definitional debate. Clarkson
(1995) pointed to inherent “fuzziness” in the term,
while Waddock and Graves (1997) lamented the
broad and poor measurement of the construct.
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Moreover, social performance activities fall along
a wide spectrum, from specific issues such as
greenhouse gas emission reduction or gover-
nance reform (Bundy et al., 2013) to broad appeals
to be good corporate citizens. Thus, while firms
may develop specific indicators (e.g., reduced
amount of carbon emissions, more transparent
reporting practices, improved union relations,
fewer product recalls), widely applicable mea-
sures and evaluation mechanisms across social
performance initiatives and industry boundaries
remain elusive (Ballou, Heitger, & Landes, 2006;
Kroeger & Weber, 2014). In short, firm social per-
formance is difficult to quantify and evaluate
(Luo, Wang, Raithel, & Zheng, 2015). In traditional
behavioral theory of the firm terms, firms lack
referents for the increasingly important criterion
of social performance. We propose that under
these ambiguous conditions stakeholder expec-
tations play an important evaluation role by
serving as social performance referents.
Stakeholder Expectations As a Social
Performance Referent
In behavioral theory of the firm grounded in fi-
nancial performance, reference points tend to be
either selected by the firm or imposed on the firm
by external forces (Shinkle, 2012).1 In contrast, we
propose that firms have agency in the degree to
which theyadopt, rebuff, or shapemoremalleable
social performance reference points (e.g., Suchman,
1995).Weview the formation of a social performance
reference point as the outcome of a negotiation pro-
cess between the firm and its stakeholders (Table 1,
rows 2 and 3).
Inanegotiationprocess, twopartieshavetheirown
positions, with a set of expectations and desires
(Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 2011), but the full range of ex-
pectations is not immediately known by the other
party (Fisher et al., 2011). As a result, social perfor-
mance reference point formation starts with an
opening stance—the firm exhibits a certain level of
social performance. Stakeholders subsequently as-
sess the firm’s social performance relative to their
expectations, which define “socially accepted and
expected structures or behaviors” (Mitchell, Agle, &
Wood,1997:866). In thiswaystakeholderexpectations
provide a standard—or referent—against which the
firmmay evaluate its actual social performance.
However, since an accurate accounting of
stakeholder expectations is not readily available,
firms cannot directly infer social performance
feedback as the discrepancy between a reference
point and their actual behavior, as they do in the
case of behavioral theory of the firm grounded in
financial performance (cf. Shinkle, 2012). Instead,
stakeholders must express visible and active so-
cial performance feedback (Table 1, row 4). The
expression of social performance feedback may
take many forms, including direct conversations
with managers, social media communication,
letter writing campaigns, or shareholder pro-
posals. Yet not all stakeholders provide social
performance feedback to firms, and not all feed-
back is addressed by firms (Waldron, Navis, &
Fisher, 2013). We draw on social identity theory to
offer stakeholder identification with the firm as
a theoretical explanation of when and how social
performance feedback is likely to be expressed
and addressed (Table 1, row 5).
A SOCIAL IDENTITY EXPLANATION FOR
SOCIAL PERFORMANCE FEEDBACK
Social identity theory suggests that one’s self is
defined by membership in social categories or
TABLE 1
Contrasting Behavioral Theory Grounded in Financial versus Social Performance
Feature of Theory Financial Performance Social Performance
(1) Reference point criterion Clear Ambiguous
(2) Reference point referent Fixed Malleable
(3) Reference point formation Selected or imposed Negotiated
(4) Performance feedback Inferred Expressed
(5) Role of social identity Low High
(6) Strategic responses Occur close to reference point Occur far from reference point
1 A notable exception is the negotiation of financial perfor-
mance expectations with analysts (Bromiley, 1991; Luo et al.,
2015) or auditors (Bame-Aldred & Kida, 2007).
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groups, including, among others, nationality,
sports teams, or religious affiliation (Tajfel &
Turner, 1979). Individuals derive value and emo-
tional significance from their identification by
perceiving a sense of oneness with other mem-
bers of the ingroup (Ashforth &Mael, 1989; Dutton,
Dukerich, & Harquail, 1994). Group identification
may best be portrayed as a reciprocal relation-
ship such that the individual derives meaning,
belonging, and positive distinctiveness that de-
fine and enhance the individual’s self-concept
(Hogg & Terry, 2014; Whetten & Mackey, 2002),
while the individual’s membership supports and
strengthens the group (Ashforth & Mael, 1989).
Social identity has been used to explain the
motivation of certain stakeholders to evaluate
firms and provide negative social performance
feedback. Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003) de-
scribed how identification with a cause in-
centivizes stakeholders to mobilize against firms.
For such cause-identified activists, negative so-
cial performance feedback against a firm repre-
sents an opportunity to express shared identity
centered around the cause and reinforces their
distinctiveness as an outgroup relative to the firm
(Ashforth & Mael, 1989). From a social identity
perspective, negative feedback from an outgroup
is unsurprising (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In fact, re-
cent research indicates that firms have grown to
expect negative feedback from activists and have
developed a well-codified repertoire of defensive
actions in response (McDonnell &King, 2013). This
literature debates the degree to which firms view
activists as gadflies (Falconer, 2004), respond
meaningfully to hostile sources (Waldron et al.,
2013), or aremore subtly strategicallymorphed by
cause-identified feedback (McDonnell, King, &
Soule, 2015). While the dynamics of “cause iden-
tification” have seen extensive developments in
the growing social movements literature (Briscoe
& Gupta, 2016), we argue that organizational
identification represents an important, unexplored,
and fundamentally different force undergirding
both negative and positive social performance
feedback.
Organizational identification provides the
means to incorporate a firm’s central, distinctive,
and enduring characteristics into an individual’s
self-concept (Albert & Whetten, 1985; Dukerich,
Golden, & Shortell, 2002) in order to satisfy the
need for self-definition and meaning (Whetten &
Mackey, 2002). Indeed, organizational identifica-
tion fosters a sense of belonging and oneness
across the diverse set of stakeholders affiliated
with the firm, as stakeholders adopt a common set
of values and beliefs so as to conform to an ideal
prototype (Hogg, Terry, & White, 1995; Tajfel &
Turner, 1979). Such a sense of oneness engenders
collective ingroup cohesion and an adherence to
the ingroup’s (i.e., the firm’s) membership norms
(Ashforth &Mael, 1989; Dutton et al., 1994; Tajfel &
Turner, 1979).
Stakeholders can internalize a firm’s central
and distinctive organizational features, such as
prestige (Mael & Ashforth, 1992), quality (Press &
Arnould,2011), innovativeness (Kreiner&Ashforth,
2004), or social performance (Bhattacharya & Sen,
2004), by affiliating themselves with the organi-
zation and participating in firm-related activities
(Whetten & Mackey, 2002). For instance, con-
sumers can prominently display their purchases
(He, Li, & Harris, 2012; Simoes, Dibb, & Fisk, 2005),
employees can participate in voluntary organi-
zational activities outside of work (Dutton &
Dukerich, 1991; Smidts, Pruyn, & Van Riel, 2001),
university graduates can engage with alumni
networks (Mael & Ashforth, 1992; Zavyalova et al.,
2016), suppliers can openly collaborate with
buyers (Corsten, Gruen, & Peyinghaus, 2011), fi-
nanciers can invest in organizations that resonate
with their values (Bauer & Smeets, 2015), and any
stakeholder can become an organizational am-
bassador (DelRı́o,Vazquez,& Iglesias, 2001;Gyrd-
Jones & Kornum, 2013). These markers of identifi-
cation enable stakeholders to internalize ingroup
characteristics, serve as differentiators from out-
groups, and allow organizations to observe, keep
track of, and interact with this salient group of
stakeholders. We focus on stakeholders who use
organizational features to define themselves and
who care about social performance. We refer to
these important constituents as FI (firm-identified)
stakeholders (cf. Zavyalova et al., 2016).
For FI stakeholders, the firm’s social perfor-
mance, positive or negative, spills over into their
identity. As Zavyalova and colleagues described
highly identified stakeholders, “They may ‘bask
in the reflected glory’ of positive events (Cialdini
et al., 1976: 366), and may feel that their personal
identities are threatened following negative
events (Harrison, Ashforth, & Corley, 2009)” (2016:
258). For instance, in the context of social perfor-
mance, there was a negative identity spillover for
Volkswagen (VW) FI stakeholders when it was
revealed that the German car manufacturer
cheatedonemissions tests, andmanyVW-identified
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customers felt “betrayed” by an organization they
perceived as reliable and environmentally friendly
(see AFP TV, 2015).
Indeed, social performance is of high interest to
FI stakeholders (Sen&Bhattacharya, 2001) since it
increasingly affects the decision of employees,
consumers, and investors alike to engage with
an organization (Bhattacharya & Sen, 2004). For
instance, more than 70 percent of college students
and 50 percent ofworkers are looking for jobswith
social impact, and nearly 60 percent of students
are even willing to take a pay cut in order to work
for a company that embodies their values. More
than 50 percent of consumers would be willing
to pay more for goods and services offered by
a company that gives back to society (Net Impact,
2012).Our theorypredicts that thegrowing set of FI
stakeholders who care about social performance
is at the source of meaningful social performance
evaluation and feedback.
As a result of their identity attachment to the
firm,FI stakeholdersare incentivized to formclear
expectations and closely monitor the social per-
formance activities of the firm they identify with.
This stands in marked contrast to stakeholders
who are nonidentified (i.e., identify neither with
the firm nor a cause). From a social identity per-
spective, nonidentified stakeholders have little
incentive to express social performance feedback
since they primarily derive their identity from
other membership groups. Rather, following
a negative event, nonidentified stakeholders face
low identity barriers to the stakeholder relation-
ship and, thus, may be quick to cease their affili-
ation (Packer, 2008; Zavyalova et al., 2016) or,
alternatively, may join more motivated stake-
holder groups, such as cause-identified activists
(Waldron et al., 2013). However, when a firm ex-
hibits high social performance, nonidentified
stakeholders may increase their organizational
identification (Bhattacharya & Sen, 2004). We
suggest, though, that nonidentified stakeholders
are less likely to independently form codified ex-
pectations regarding the social performance of
a firm, monitor firm activities, or invest efforts to
provide visible and active feedback to a firm from
which they do not derive identity characteristics.
In contrast, FI stakeholders are not only more
likely to closely monitor their firm’s social per-
formance activities but also more likely to have
strong incentives to agree with the firm’s social
performanceactions. Individuals seek topreserve
congruence in all aspects of their life by denying
inconsistencies, focusing on consistencies, chang-
ing expectations, or altering evaluations (Cooper &
Fazio, 1984; Sherman & Gorkin, 1980). We suggest
that FI stakeholders seek to maintain coherency
regarding their identity by granting the firm they
identify with a relatively wide range of acceptable
social performance behaviors. On the one hand,
when there are minor negative discrepancies be-
tween their expectations and the firm’s social per-
formance,FI stakeholderswill tend toavoid identity
conflict when judging the firm’s social performance
in order to preservea sense of onenesswith the firm
(Ashforth & Mael, 1989). For instance, previous re-
searchhasshown that organizational identification
increases resilience by supporting the firm during
times of negative attention (Bhattacharya & Sen,
2004; Zavyalova et al., 2016). On the other hand, mi-
norpositivediscrepancieswill fall in linewith theFI
stakeholders’ perceptions of their firm. FI stake-
holders will appreciate the positive attributes
derived from their firm identification, and it will
reinforce FI stakeholders’ self-concept.
Thus, tomaintainand reinforceself-continuity in
their identity, FI stakeholders are likely to tolerate
and adapt to minor discrepancies by granting
a wide range of acceptable social performance
behaviors to their firm. In other words, FI stake-
holders’ organizational identification drives con-
vergence between stakeholder expectations and
a firm’s actual social performance, reducing the
need to provide visible and active social perfor-
mance feedback to the firm. However, in the face of
major discrepancies, our theory contends that FI
stakeholders face other identity incentives to enter
a substantial negotiation process with the firm.
NEGOTIATING A SOCIAL PERFORMANCE
REFERENCE POINT
While we expect FI stakeholders to grant lati-
tude to a firm’s actual social performance when
facing minor discrepancies, identity-driven moti-
vationswill incentivize FI stakeholders to provide
visible and active social performance feedback
when they face a major discrepancy. On the neg-
ative side, there are limits to the level of discrep-
ancy a stakeholder iswilling to endure (Blomqvist
& Posner, 2004; Zavyalova et al., 2016); on the
positive side, there arebenefits to visibly praising
an organization a stakeholder identifies with
(Cialdini et al., 1976).
Major discrepancies reflect a critical discon-
nect between firm and FI stakeholder views
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regarding the appropriate level of social perfor-
mance for the firm. Since FI stakeholders and
firms have agency regarding their responses, we
propose that both firms and FI stakeholders enter
a negotiation process aimed at forming a social
performance reference point. This negotiation
process rests on conflict between stakeholders’
desire to maintain a positive self-concept and
firms’ desire to maintain financial efficiency. As
a result, negative feedback emanates from
stakeholder concerns around a firm’s past social
performance activities, and positive feedback
creates firm concerns around its future social
performance responsibilities. This negotiation
may or may not end in a shared social perfor-
mance reference point.
From theperspective of FI stakeholders, there is
a range of strategies available to express social
performance feedback. Most broadly, FI stake-
holders express feedback by providing or with-
holding financial, human, social, or natural
resources (Frooman, 1999; Rowley, 1997; Rowley &
Moldoveanu, 2003). In a direct and conventional
fashion, FI stakeholders can write letters or have
offline interactionswith firmmanagers to express
their expectations. Technological advancements
provide contemporary stakeholders with even
greater ability to quickly and clearly communi-
cate directly with firms. As of 2014, 83 percent of
Fortune 500 companies were on Facebook, 83
percent had Twitter accounts, and 97 were on
LinkedIn (Barnes & Lascault, 2015). By utilizing
social media, blogs, video platforms, and con-
sumer reviewwebsites, stakeholders can air their
praise or grievances ina forum that thepublicwill
view and firms will monitor (Wang, Wezel, &
Forgues, 2016).
From the perspective of the firm, it has in-
centives to monitor and respond to FI stakeholder
feedback. Many firms seek to engender identifi-
cation among their stakeholders and even ac-
tively create FI stakeholders through initiatives
developing brand ambassadors, social media
influencers, or highly dedicated employees
(Malhotra, Malhotra, & See, 2013). In addition, FI
stakeholders are often loyal constituents (Mael &
Ashforth, 1995) and, thus, provide important re-
sources to the firm (Ashforth & Mael, 1989). Em-
ployee identification increases job satisfaction
and tenure (Turban & Greening, 1997). Alumni’s
identificationwith their almamater increases the
likelihood theywill donate (Zavyalova et al., 2016)
and encourage their relatives to attend university
events (Mael & Ashforth, 1992). As a result, FI
stakeholders, as a collective, are likely to be rec-
ognized by firms and have high salience with
firms owing to stakeholder power and legitimacy
(Mitchell et al., 1997; Zavyalova et al., 2016). Power
is gained by FI stakeholders’ deep engagement
with the firm and the material support that would
be lost if FI stakeholders exited the relationship,
in essence giving FI stakeholders a utilitarian
power base to influence the firm (Etzioni, 1964;
Mitchell et al., 1997). Legitimacy stems from the
notion that FI stakeholders make up a foundation
of the firm’s most committed and engaged
stakeholders.
Given this intimate connection, if a firm cannot
satisfy the social performance expectations of its
most enthusiastic stakeholders, it will likely not
continue in the long run. Together, the power and
legitimacy accrued by the collective of FI stake-
holders give FI stakeholders’ social performance
feedback credence with firms. In this way FI
stakeholders take an active stance in the stake-
holder relationship (Mitchell et al., 1997), and
firms are incentivized to monitor FI stakeholder
social performance feedback (Hall, 2015; Keys,
Malnight, & van der Graaf, 2009).
The social performance feedback expressed by
FI stakeholders provides an important bench-
mark for firm social performance activities. How-
ever, firms have agency in responding to
stakeholder feedback (Berman, Wicks, Kotha, &
Jones, 1999), and they can use a broad array of
strategies in their negotiation of the reference
point. This repertoire of tools can be broadly cat-
egorized into two types: substantive and symbolic
(Bundyetal., 2013;Westphal&Zajac, 1998). Table 2
provides an overview of each category of sub-
stantive and symbolic strategic responses, in-
cluding definitions, precedent in the literature,
and select examples.
Substantive actions alter firms’ actual social
performance levels. That is, firms undertake
large-scale strategic changes that directly in-
crease or decrease social performance activities.
Since measuring social performance is ambigu-
ous, there is flexibility in how aggregate levels of
social performance are altered. Substantive ac-
tions may be technical, which we use to refer to
social performance changes to existing opera-
tions that address the root cause of the feedback
(Zavyalova, Pfarrer, Reger, & Shapiro, 2012). For
instance, a clothing company facing criticism for
poor labor practices in itsmanufacturing facilities
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may move the location of its manufacturing opera-
tions to a more worker-friendly location. Alterna-
tively, substantive actions may be additive, which
we define as creating new social performance ini-
tiatives that do not address the root cause. For in-
stance, the same clothing company may launch
a new line of environmentally friendly clothes from
recycled materials, without changing the location
or conditions of its manufacturing facility. Both
substantive-technical and substantive-additive ac-
tions are intended tomore closely align the firmwith
FI stakeholder expectations by increasing the ag-
gregate level of firm social performance.
In contrast, symbolic actions are intended to
alter stakeholder social performance expecta-
tions (Carroll, 1979; Davis & Blomstrom, 1966;
Mahon & Wartick, 2003), without changing the
actual level of the firm’s social performance (cf.
Oliver, 1991). Symbolic tactics include public re-
lations and bargaining approaches to manage or
manipulate FI stakeholder social performance
expectations. Symbolic actions may be related to
social performance, such as drawing attention to
employee safety initiatives in a corporate social
responsibility (CSR) report, or unrelated to social
performance, such as drawing attention to a
product quality award with a new press release.
Substantive and symbolic responses expand
the traditional reactions to performance feedback
in behavioral theory of the firm. Behavioral theory
of the firm grounded in financial performance
largely predicts changes in search behavior—
stimulating problemistic search below the refer-
encepoint and reducingsearchabove the reference
point (Cyert&March, 1963;Greve, 2003).Wesuggest
that the ambiguous nature of social performance
allows for a different pattern of firm strategic re-
sponses than those predicted by extant behavioral
theory. First, behavioral theory of the firmgrounded
in financial performance predicts that pronounced
strategic responseswill occur close to the reference
point, since firms are most sensitive to feedback
when they are just above or just below their refer-
ence point (Cyert & March, 1963). When it concerns
social performance, we suggest that strategic re-
sponseswill bemorepronounced far away from the
referencepoint. That is, firmswill tolerate relatively
weak feedback and only be induced to make
meaningful responses when there are major dis-
crepancies and, thus, intense social performance
feedback (Table 1, row 6).
Second, firmsmaydirectly increase or decrease
socialperformance (substantiveactions) inamanner
that is not possible with financial performance. In-
deed,while there iscertainty inquantifying financial
performance, there is little certainty regarding strat-
egies implemented to improve financial perfor-
mance, and, thus, financial performance must be
TABLE 2
Examples of Strategic Responses to Social Performance Feedback
Strategic Response Definition Precedent in the Literature (If Any) Select Examples from Text
Substantive actions Actions directed at moving
actual social performance
closer to expectations
Westphal & Zajac (1998),
Zavyalova, Pfarrer, Reger, &
Hubbard (2016)
Substantive
technical
Social performance changes to
existing operations (addresses
the root cause of the feedback)
Godfrey, Merrill, & Hansen (2009),
Zavyalova, Pfarrer, Reger, &
Shapiro (2012)
Moving manufacturing location to
more worker-friendly location
Substantive
additive
New social performance
initiatives (does not address
the root cause of feedback)
Developed in this article Launching a new line of eco-
friendly products
Symbolic actions Actions attempting to influence
stakeholder expectations
without changing actual social
performance
Ashforth & Gibbs (1990),
Westphal & Zajac (1998),
Zavyalova et al. (2012)
Symbolic related Symbolic actions that are related
to social performance
Developed in this article Press release or social media
posting about volunteer
activities, philanthropic work,
or social performance award
Symbolic
unrelated
Symbolic actions that are
unrelated to social
performance
Developed in this article Press release or social media
posting about product quality
award or strong financial
performance
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adjusted through indirect search behaviors (Gavetti
et al., 2012). In contrast, ambiguity inmeasuring and
aggregating social performance actually allows
firms todirectlyadapt it, sincemore recent initiatives
may overshadowpast behaviors (Levinthal &March
1993;Wagner,Lutz,&Weitz,2009)andquicklychange
stakeholder perceptions.
Third, social performance also allows firms to
alter reference points themselves in a manner
that is not possible with more fixed financial
performance benchmarks.While firmsmay select
different referents when underperforming finan-
cially to cast themselves in a more positive light
(Jordan&Audia, 2012), they have little to no ability
to change a referent itself. Firms cannot sub-
stantively change last year’s ROA or industry
average ROA (Shinkle, 2012). In contrast, stake-
holder expectations are malleable (Coombs &
Holladay, 2004; Finkelstein&Hambrick, 1988) and,
thus, may be altered by symbolic actions that do
not involve changing the underlying social per-
formance level. For these reasons, in contrast to
traditional behavioral theory of the firm, where
a financial performance reference point is se-
lected and feedback is inferred, we suggest that
a shared social performance reference point is
actively negotiated between FI stakeholders and
the firm (Table 1, rows 1–4).
SOCIAL PERFORMANCE FEEDBACK AND
STRATEGIC RESPONSES
There are two possible outcomes of the initial
negotiation stance: (1) actual social performance
is belowFI stakeholder expectations (i.e., negative
feedback) or (2) actual social performance is above
FI stakeholder expectations (i.e., positive feed-
back). Negative or positive performance feedback
is a foundational basis in behavioral theory of the
firm; however, we argue that social performance
feedback dynamics will also depend on whether
social performance is central to organizational
identity (i.e., whether the firm is a social enterprise
or not). While stakeholder identification with the
firm motivates feedback, FI stakeholder percep-
tions of acceptable social performance will be
different when stakeholders identify with the firm
because of its social performance, as in the case of
social enterprises. In addition, given that social
performance is at the core of their organizational
identity, social enterprises have identity-driven
incentives to respond to FI stakeholder social per-
formance feedbackand todistinguish their actions
fromnonsocial enterprises (Table1, row5). Figure1
illustrates theunderlying logic andpossible initial
outcomes of the negotiation process depending on
feedback valence (negative or positive) and orga-
nizational identity (nonsocial versus social enter-
prise). Below we unpack this model by describing
why and how FI stakeholders and firms negotiate
acceptable levels of social performance in each of
these four scenarios.
Nonsocial Enterprise Social Performance Below
FI Stakeholder Expectations
Expressing intense negative social perfor-
mance feedback. When FI stakeholders discover
that the firm does not perform aswell as expected
in terms of, for example, recycling and sustain-
able sourcing, stakeholders may rationalize the
behavior. Thoughts of the nature “That is proba-
bly standard for the industry” or “Limiting envi-
ronmental initiatives allows the company to
provide reasonable prices to consumers or bene-
fits to employees” essentially dismiss and avoid
recognition of discrepancies between expecta-
tions and actual firm social performance. How-
ever, if the same stakeholders discover that the
firm runs sweatshops using child labor, this dis-
covery may create an insurmountable discrep-
ancy with their expectations. For instance,
Zavyalova and colleagues (2016) found that, de-
spite initial support, highly identified stake-
holders eventually withdraw support from
reputable organizations as the level of negative
attention to the organization increases.
Because individuals seek to view themselves in
a positive light (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), FI stake-
holders will be concerned with the negative im-
plications of such low social performance on
personal self-concept. This will trigger an
identity-driven reaction of self-protection, which
is the desire to shelter or defend one’s positive
self-views in one’s own eyes or in the eyes of
others (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009; Sedikides, 2009).
We propose that self-protection will drive FI
stakeholders to provide intense negative social
performance feedback—that is, visible andactive
criticism of the firm. Stakeholders may withhold
or provide critical resources (Frooman, 1999; Pfeffer
& Salancik, 1978) or may seek to compel change
(James & Wooten, 2006; Morrison, 1991). For in-
stance,FIemployeesmaydirectlyexpressconcerns
to managers of the firm (O’Connell, Stephens, Betz,
Shepard, & Hendry, 2005), decrease productivity
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(Kristof-Brown, Zimmerman, & Johnson, 2005), and
threaten to quit (Turban & Greening, 1997). FI con-
sumers may vocalize concerns through the media,
decrease consumption, or demand change (Sen &
Bhattacharya, 2001). FI suppliers may reduce the
exchange of valuable tacit knowledge and explicit
information (Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000) or decrease
asset-specific investments (Dyer, 1997).
The case of Market Basket provides a compel-
ling example of how FI stakeholders across di-
verse types can band together to express intense
negative social performance feedback. Suppliers,
employees, customers, and community members
organized visible and active protests online and
in person, even boycotting the New England
grocery store chain they cherished, to provoke
change after new leadership gained power,
forced out the beloved CEO, and violated FI
stakeholder expectations by cutting the firm’s
long-standing commitment to community social
performance (Newbert & Craig, 2015).
We contend that this intense negative feedback
fulfills two self-protection identity purposes for FI
stakeholders. First, it protects current stakeholder
identity by differentiating the FI stakeholders
from negative identity spillover. Individuals pro-
tect their identity by distancing themselves from
unfavorable events and attempting to cast them-
selves in a positive light (Hogg & Terry, 2014).
When the discrepancy between FI stakeholder
expectations and firm social performance is too
significant to adapt expectations, intense nega-
tive social performance feedback is the mecha-
nism that reconciles the identity threat. Intense
negative feedback serves to differentiate the FI
stakeholders’ firm membership from the firm’s
lower social performance activities. Second, in-
tense negative feedback seeks to preserve FI
stakeholder identity by compelling the firm to re-
align with FI stakeholders’ higher social perfor-
mance expectations.
While exiting the relationship with a firm that
falls far below social performance expectations is
an option for non-FI stakeholders, this is not the
case for FI stakeholders. FI stakeholders are
deeply associated with the firm, to the extent that
they derive their self-concept from it. As a result,
exiting the relationship means undertaking a
FIGURE 1
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challenging, uncomfortable, time-consuming, and
costlyprocessof identitychange todisidentify from
the firm. External recognition of group member-
ship means that organizational features become
entrenched in how FI stakeholders are perceived
and categorized by others (Turner &Onorato, 1999).
Other groups are unlikely to be willing to accept
new and stigmatized members into their own
ingroup under unfavorable conditions. In addition,
the internal fulfillment of identity from group
membershipmeans that removing something from
one’s identity involves questioning one’s beliefs,
remodeling mental schemas, and redefining who
one is (Burke, 2006). As described above, there are
strong self-continuity incentives not to undergo
dramatic identity changes. Since disentangling
identity once one is highly identified is very dif-
ficult, FI stakeholders are likely to view dis-
identifying and rebuilding identity through other
groups as a tactic of last resort (Burke, 2006).
However, FI stakeholders’ dissent (i.e., attempts
to challenge group behavior) can actually signal
their loyalty to the firmwhileshowingawillingness
to improve the group (Packer, 2008). For these rea-
sons, we suggest that FI stakeholders have strong
incentives to provide intense negative feedback
that brings about changes in social performance
activities to restore the firm and corresponding
stakeholder self-identity to a positive light.
Strategic framing and responding to negative
social performance feedback. In the context of
social performance, we contend that the tradi-
tional behavioral theory of the firm’s loss
frame—which captures concern regarding pre-
vious financial performance below the reference
point—will manifest as a legitimacy concern.
That is, we propose that nonsocial enterprises
filter intense negative social performance feed-
back from FI stakeholders through a strategic
frame of legitimacy. When firm social perfor-
mance falls below FI stakeholder expectations,
the firm will question whether it adheres to
stakeholders’ values and norms of acceptable
behavior (Suchman, 1995). Since FI stakeholders
are salient stakeholders, violating their expecta-
tions has material influence on firm resources
(Cragg & Greenbaum, 2002; Pajunen, 2006). If left
unchecked, a loss of legitimacy may destabilize
operations and even threaten the very survival of
the firm (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Suchman, 1995).
Furthermore, if FI stakeholders deem firm be-
haviors to be illegitimate, they can not only with-
draw legitimacy endowments but also stimulate
legitimacy loss fromotherstakeholders. IngroupFI
stakeholders may utilize their power to mobilize
nonidentified stakeholders or add credibility to the
claims of outgroup activist stakeholders (Waldron
et al., 2013). Indeed, if loyal stakeholders are un-
satisfiedwithsocialperformance levels, the firm is
unlikely to find support from other stakeholder
groups. Thus, firms must take FI stakeholders’
grievances seriously.
Firms have several options regarding how to
respond to this intense negative social perfor-
mance feedback. First, they could ignore the
negative feedback. While some firms may come
out relatively unscathed when ignoring cause-
identified activists (Waldron et al., 2013), FI
stakeholders provide far more support and ulti-
mately confer legitimacy. Thus, we argue that FI
stakeholders hold greater bargaining power in
the reference point negotiation with the firm than
activists and will demand a response. While
a firm may consider leaving the negotiation and
engendering identification in an alternative set of
stakeholders (who can then provide them with
legitimacy), this is not likely to be feasible in the
midst of intense negative scrutiny.
Second, firms may respond with symbolic ac-
tions that seek to appease FI stakeholders and
manipulate their expectations. Again, symbolic
actions may be an effective tactic when facing
activist criticisms, since this tactic can mollify
outrage and mitigate the spread of negative
attention to other more salient stakeholders
(McDonnell & King, 2013; Waldron et al., 2013).
However, since FI stakeholders share identity at-
tributes with the firm, they are likely to see
through the veil of symbolic actions intended to
move stakeholder expectations without changing
actual social performance. In fact, attempts to
“greenwash” or enact other less meaningful ini-
tiatives when facing intense negative social per-
formance feedback may actually exacerbate
negative impressions (Zavyalova et al., 2012) and
stimulate further backlash against the firm’s
perceived insincere response to intense identity-
driven feedback. As a result, we theorize that
firms receiving intense negative feedback fromFI
stakeholders will move beyond a mere concern
with keeping up appearances (cf. McDonnell &
King, 2013).
Connelly, Tihanyi, Certo, and Hitt (2010) have
made analogous arguments about substantive ac-
tions by firmswith dedicated institutional investors
who have higher ownership concentrations—and,
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wesuggest, are likely toholdstronger identification
with their investments—compared to more tran-
sient investors. These authors found that firmswith
dedicated institutional investors are more likely to
enact tangible strategic competitive actions com-
pared to potentially reversible tactical actions. In
the case of social performance, we propose that
firms will respond to intense negative FI stake-
holder feedback with substantive responses that
increase actual levels of social performance, rather
than more superficial symbolic actions. However,
since social performance is ambiguous, its level
can be directly increased either by launching new
social performance initiatives (substantive addi-
tive) or by addressing the root cause of the negative
attention (substantive technical).
We suggest that firms for which social perfor-
mance is not central to organizational identity are
likely to enact substantive-additive responses to
intensenegativeperformancefeedback.Substantive-
additive responses are tangible and meaningful so-
cial performance actions but do not involve the same
level of cost and risk as altering core operational ac-
tivities. In this way, substantive-additive strategies
allow firms to create new social performance activi-
ties without making dramatic changes to existing
operations. However, the new social initiatives serve
the purpose of restoring FI stakeholder alignment
with the firm, since overall levels of social perfor-
mance activity increase. Thus, in this scenario,
substantive-additive responses of social perfor-
mance represent the most viable means to realign
expectations and restore legitimacy.
The recent VW “dieselgate” emissions scandal
exemplifies the dynamics of negative social per-
formance feedback. VW is generally known for
safety, quality, and reliability; hence, stake-
holders are likely to identify with these central
organizational characteristics. When it was re-
vealed that VW cheated by artificially reducing
emissions levels during testing compared to real-
world driving, VW’s FI stakeholders who cared
about social performance were motivated to pro-
tect their own identity by voicing intense negative
social performance feedback. CNNprofiled FI VW
drivers who described identity harm arising from
being deceived by a car they really believed in
(Garcia, 2015). The intense identity reactions of FI
stakeholders even became the subject a popular
parody featuring FI VW owners expressing their
feelings of betrayal to their cars (Funny or Die,
2015). Consumer reports created a guide to the
emissions scandal that concludedwith a “Howdo
I voice my concerns” section, encouraging stake-
holders to visibly and actively vocalize feedback
across outlets, such as commenting on their
stories, contacting the company, or contacting
the Environmental Protection Agency (Barlett,
Naranjo, & Plungis, 2017). In response, VW
announced a new major social performance
initiative—an aggressive strategic plan focused
on electric cars, with no less than thirty new
electric vehicles across its brands by 2025 (Geuss,
2016). This additive approach introduces a new
and more legitimately eco-friendly product to its
existing line of reliable and high-performance
cars.
This practical evidence exemplifies our more
formal proposition.
Proposition 1: Nonsocial enterprises are
likely to respond to intense negative
social performance feedback from FI
stakeholders with new social perfor-
mance initiatives (substantive additive).
Nonsocial Enterprise Social Performance Above
FI Stakeholder Expectations
Expressing intense positive social perfor-
mance feedback. On the positive side of the ref-
erence point, when an FI stakeholder realizes that
their firm sponsors a local Little League baseball
team, they may align expectations with perfor-
mance through such thoughts as “Of course it
does things like this; it’s a good corporate citizen”
or “That is normal for modern corporations.”
However, if the same stakeholder discovers that
the firm unexpectedly donated $10 million to a
local homeless shelter, they are likely to have
amore intenseresponsedrivenbyself-enhancement
identity considerations. Self-enhancement refers to
the desire to amplify the positive aspects of the self
in one’s own eyes or in the eyes of others (Shore,
Cleveland, & Goldberg, 2003). This need for high
self-esteem will induce FI stakeholders to further
associate their self with the firm.
Self-enhancement will drive FI stakeholders to
provide intense positive social performance
feedback—that is, visible and active praise for
their firm. Visible and active praise allows at-
tractive firm attributes to reflect on and be
incorporated into identity (Ashforth & Mael, 1989;
Cialdini et al., 1976). In the case of social perfor-
mance above FI stakeholder expectations, in-
tense positive feedback allows FI stakeholders
to reap the positive benefits of firm affiliation. In
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doing so, FI stakeholders incorporate the higher
levels of social performance into their self-
concept, which also raises their future expecta-
tions of social performance.
Stakeholders have a broad range of means to
communicate visible and active praise to a firm.
They may increase their direct contact with the
firm through writing letters of appreciation,
“@”ing the firm on social media with praise, and
producing more favorable reviews (Bhattacharya
& Sen, 2004). They may also seek to engage other
stakeholder groups in recognition of the firm by
mobilizing social media campaigns or garnering
more traditionalmedia attention. Employeesmay
increase organizational citizenship and extra-
role behaviors (Dutton et al., 1994).
In sum,we suggest that FI stakeholders express
the major positive discrepancy between expec-
tations and firm social performance by providing
intense positive social performance feedback to
enhance their own self-concept.
Strategic framing and responding to positive
social performance feedback. In the context of
social performance, we suggest that the tradi-
tional behavioral theory of the firm’s gain
frame—which captures the perspective re-
garding previous financial performance above
the reference point—will manifest as an effi-
ciency concern. Intense positive social perfor-
mance feedback signals to a firm that it is
investing in social performance activities that
were not demanded or expected. Engaging in so-
cial performance activities is costly (Walters
et al., 2010; Williamson, Lynch-Wood, & Ramsay,
2006), and these activities’ financial returns are
not always clear (Ullmann, 1985; Wood & Jones,
1995). As such, the benefits of social performance
beyond FI stakeholder expectations are likely to
be lower than the costs. In fact, Barnett and
Salomon (2006) proposed that the relationship
between social performance and financial per-
formance takes an inverted-U shape, indicating
that an overabundance of social performancewill
ultimately conflict with financial performance.
We follow this logic and argue that the turning
point where social performance activities exhibit
diminishing returns is at the level of FI stake-
holder expectations. That is, investing in social
performance activities beyond what the firm’s
loyal and influential FI stakeholders expect con-
stitutes investments with limited recompense.
There is further danger to intense positive so-
cial performance, beyond costs. As described
earlier, when positive attributes of higher social
performance are incorporated into an FI stake-
holder’s self-concept, it raises their future expec-
tations of firm social performance. In this way,
firms may face a type of social performance “Red
Queen effect” (Derfus, Maggitti, Grimm, & Smith,
2008; van Valen, 1977) such that the more social
a firm becomes, the more social performance FI
stakeholders will expect. This can create an es-
calating cycle whereby firms must engage in an
increasing level of social performance to satisfy
stakeholder demands, which, in turn, causes
firms to endure increasing expenditures and risk
future legitimacy loss.
As a result, firms for which social performance
is not central to organizational identity will take
action to mitigate rising social performance ex-
pectations.However,managingfutureexpectations
under conditions of positive social performance
feedback from FI stakeholders is a delicate issue.
Whereas embracing positive acclaim makes
firms vulnerable to violating rising expectations
and experiencing intense negative social perfor-
mance feedback in the future, rejecting positive
social performance feedback risks alienating FI
stakeholders who welcome the reputational ben-
efits conferred by higher levels of firm social
performance than expected.
We propose that firms address this conundrum
by resorting to symbolic actions that attempt to
alter stakeholder expectations without changing
the actual level of firm social performance. Past
research has examined how firms utilize sym-
bolic actions related to social performance to
address negative feedback from activists
(McDonnell & King, 2013; Oliver, 1991; Suchman,
1995), including the use of CSR reports (Feldner &
Berg, 2014), social media activity touting philan-
thropic programs (Gershbein, 2015), or press re-
leases related to social performance awards
(Zavyalova et al., 2012). However, we argue that
when firms face intense positive social perfor-
mance feedback, symbolic actions related to so-
cial performance may serve to “pile on” social
accolades that are likely to exacerbate already
rising expectations. In contrast to extant litera-
ture, we contend that firms use symbolic actions
unrelated to social performance to address in-
tense positive feedback from FI stakeholders.
Symbolic actions unrelated to social perfor-
mance include social media posts emphasizing
product quality, annual reports focusing on eco-
nomic trends, orpressreleases indicating financial
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performance successes. For instance, a firm fac-
ing intense positive feedback for introducing
sustainable materials into their manufacturing
process may respond by featuring a recent prod-
uct quality award on their Facebook page or is-
suing a press release to report on recent strong
financial performance. These strategies seek to
deflect the positive social performance feedback
by drawing attention to alternative positive
characteristics of the firm (Ashforth &Gibbs, 1990)
that are not related to social performance. Such
actions will leverage some of the positive atten-
tion that the firm is receivingbut seek to channel it
into building FI stakeholders’ perceptions of the
firm in a way that does not increase their social
performance expectations.
Proposition 2: Nonsocial enterprises are
likely to respond to intense positive so-
cial performance feedback from FI
stakeholderswith symbolic actions that
are unrelated to social performance.
Social Enterprises’ Double Standard
Behavioral theory of the firm grounded in fi-
nancial performance generally does not consider
significant differences across how firms form,
frame, and respond to reference points, because
financial performance is considered central to all
firms’ existence. However, firms vary in the cen-
trality of social performance to their organiza-
tional identity. In particular, social enterprises
view social performance as primary and central
(Bacq & Janssen, 2011), and they directly integrate
social causes into their firm identity. As exam-
ples,GrameenBank’s cause is poverty alleviation
through financial inclusion, Aravind Eye Care
Systems’ cause is to improve universal access to
visual health by means of pay-what-you-can
surgeries, and Method’s cause is environmental
sustainability through development of eco-
friendly and nontoxic household products.
The distinct identity of social enterprises has
two major implications for a behavioral theory of
social performance. First, FI stakeholders of a so-
cial enterprise identify de facto with its social
performance activities—or cause—since they
form the core of the social enterprise’s organiza-
tional identity. As a result, stakeholders who
identify with a social enterprise are likely to
evaluate the criterion of social performance differ-
ently than stakeholders who identify with a non-
social enterprise. Second, social performance
feedback strikes at the identity core of social
enterprises, and identity considerations are impor-
tant drivers of their strategic decision-making pro-
cess (Fauchart & Gruber, 2011; Wry & York, 2017).
Thus,weelaboratebelowonthesocialperformance
feedbackconsequencesofhavingboth firm-specific
and cause-specific factors embedded in the firm
identity (Wry & York, 2017). We propose that com-
pared to nonsocial enterprises, social enterprises
face different social performance evaluation pro-
cesses and enact different firm strategic responses
to FI stakeholder social performance feedback.
The “double identification” with both the firm
itself and its social performance activities leads
FI stakeholders to evaluate and provide feedback
to social enterprises differently than nonsocial
enterprises. First, stakeholders who identify with
a social enterprise derive part of their own iden-
tity from the firm’s social performance activities.
Drawing on social performance helps these
stakeholders not only enhance their self-concept
but also increase distinctiveness by differentiat-
ing themselves from FI stakeholders of nonsocial
enterprises (Ashforth & Mael, 1989). For instance,
highly identified employees at a microfinance
institution see themselves as different from tra-
ditional bank employees, since they view their
work as a means to advance social causes
of financial inclusion and poverty alleviation
(Battilana & Dorado, 2010).
Second, because FI stakeholders of social en-
terprises also integrate social causes into their
self-concept, we argue that they aremore likely to
draw on higher-level social performance stan-
dards to form their social performance expecta-
tions. Indeed, cause-identified stakeholders view
social performance shortfallings as an opportu-
nity to advance their social cause (Rowley &
Moldoveanu, 2003). Since their expectations are
not firm specific, we suggest that the expectations
of social enterprises’ FI stakeholders will bemore
rigid than rather malleable firm-specific social
performance expectations. For instance, there is
evidence that activists attempt to hold companies
to industry-leading social performance practices
(Christmann, 2004; Zadek, 2004). For many firms,
this high standard of social performance is un-
realistic and may not be particularly relevant
since FI stakeholders are unlikely to expect such
high levels of social performance. However, in the
caseofsocialenterprises,whocenterorganizational
identity around a cause, we suggest that FI stake-
holders do expect high levels of social performance
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in line with the kind of industry-leading standards
promoted by activists. This creates a higher level of
social performance expectations for social enter-
prises, relative to nonsocial enterprises. Because FI
stakeholders of a social enterprise deem the same
level of social performance to be unacceptable for
the social enterprise they identify with, but accept-
able for a nonsocial enterprise, we refer to this as
the “social enterprise double standard.”
TOMS shoes provides an example of the social
enterprise double standard. When TOMS pio-
neered the “buy-one, give-one” businessmodel in
2006 by donating a pair of shoes to a child in need
for every pair purchased from the company, this
appealing social business model drove its
stakeholders to identify with the firm and its core
cause. Indeed, FI stakeholders deepened their
affiliation with TOMS by becoming brand am-
bassadors on college campuses and volunteers in
their “shoedrops.”This stakeholder identification
allowed TOMS to spend significantly less money
than competitors on marketing and operations
(Pride & Ferrell, 2015). By 2011 TOMS shoes were
carried by hundreds of retailers, and the company
had achieved widespread success (Mycoskie,
2011). However, in 2013, after the revelation that
TOMS was producing a significant portion of its
shoes in Chinese factories, the same identity at-
tachment to TOMS led its FI stakeholders to lam-
baste the company. Manufacturing in China is
seen as standard operating procedure for many
globalized firms (even preferable to the emerging
lower-wage manufacturing hubs of Bangladesh,
Cambodia, and Vietnam; Bradsher, 2013), but for
a social enterprise like TOMS, it was deemed
a strategy that conflicted with TOMS’ core identity
and was arguably hurting the interests of the com-
pany’s core impoverished beneficiaries (Parmar,
2013; Short, 2013). We suggest that while the cen-
trality of social performance to organizational
identity influences stakeholder evaluations, it is
also likely to affect how social enterprises frame
and respond to social performance feedback.
Social Enterprises’ Framing and Response to
Negative Social Performance Feedback
Because their core identity is grounded in social
performance, social enterprises experience identity
spillover from the social performance feedback
expressed by FI stakeholders. As a result, social
enterprises interpret social performance feedback
throughidentity framesthatdonotapplytononsocial
enterprises and that may congrue or conflict with
the strategic frames of legitimacy and efficiency.
When facing intense negative social performance
feedback, social enterprises will perceive it as an
identity threat (e.g., Dutton & Dukerich, 1991),
which will trigger self-protection behaviors. Self-
protection will cause the firms to want to funda-
mentally reduce damage and restore their core
identity. Indeed, for social enterprises, faltering
on social performance undermines their very raison
d’être.Wehavetheorized thatFIstakeholdersprotect
their identity by providing negative feedback to dis-
tinguish themselves from the firm they identify with.
Similarly, we suggest that social enterprises protect
their identity by taking social performance actions
that differentiate them from nonsocial enterprises.
We suggest that this self-protection identity
frame is consistent with the strategic frame of le-
gitimacy. In fact, since the legitimacy frame re-
volves around losing FI stakeholder support, we
suggest that identity self-protection consider-
ations will intensify legitimacy concerns. As a re-
sult, social enterpriseswill be highlymotivated to
make fundamental social performance changes
that nonsocial enterprises would be unwilling to
make. Specifically, social enterprises will make
substantive changes to increase social perfor-
mance through technical actions—that is, social
performance changes to existing operations that
address the root cause of the feedback. This
stands in contrast to nonsocial enterprises that
take substantive actions to restore legitimacy by
increasing social performance through new so-
cial performance initiatives, without necessarily
addressing the root cause. Social enterprises will
recognize that their FI stakeholders draw on
industry-leading social performance standards
and that new social performance initiatives will
not cover up social performance shortfallings in
their existing operations.
For example, we can see how TOMS (a social
enterprise) and Nike (a nonsocial enterprise)
reacted differently to intense negative social
performance feedback regarding their manufactur-
ingoperations.On theonehand,TOMS, in response
to backlash against its manufacturing facilities
in China, decided to relocate one-third of its
manufacturing facilities to Haiti, a country where
they could have a greater social impact. On the
other hand, Nike addressed public outrage re-
garding abusive labor practices in their facili-
ties by increasing monitoring, pledging to
conform to stricter regulations (Nisen, 2013),
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and venturing into “green” eco-friendly prod-
ucts (Andersen, 2015; Jana, 2009). But as human
rights activists revealed, such monitoring
failed to comprehensively address problems,
and Nike has been forced to acknowledge
widespread issues in its factories, even after
claiming to have substantively addressed
these root causes in their operations (Nisen,
2013). Compared to TOMS’ response, Nike’s re-
sponses were more substantive-additive actions
thanTOMS’ substantive-technical actions of closing
problematic factories and relocating to a more
“worker-friendly” location. We suggest that it is
a self-protection identity frame coupledwith a legit-
imacy frame that differentiates social enterprises
from nonsocial enterprises and drives social enter-
prises to make substantive-technical social perfor-
mance changes to their existing operations in
response to intense negative social performance
feedback. We state this more formally in the fol-
lowing proposition.
Proposition 3: Social enterprises are
likely to respond to intense negative
social performance feedback from FI
stakeholders with social performance
changes to existing operations (sub-
stantive technical).
Social Enterprises’ Framing and Response to
Positive Social Performance Feedback
In contrast to nonsocial enterprises, social en-
terprises facing intense positive social perfor-
mance feedback will perceive the situation as an
identity opportunity (e.g., Dutton & Dukerich,
1991), which will trigger a self-enhancement
identity frame. Social enterprises will garner
identity benefits from intense positive social
performance feedback and, as a result, will desire
to quickly incorporate it into their identity. Such
desirable social performance feedback resonates
with firm identity and presents a strategic op-
portunity for a social enterprise to differentiate
itself fromnonsocial enterprises by reinforcing its
distinctive status (Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Rowley
&Moldoveanu, 2003). Thus, rather than seeking to
deflect the positive attention, social enterprises
will likelywant to relish it and use themomentum
to further achieve their social mission.
At the same time, social enterprises also face
trade-offs between financial andsocial performance
(Battilana, Sengul, Pache, & Model, 2015; Zhao &
Grimes, 2016). Strategically, social enterprises must
also view positive social performance feedback
through the same efficiency frame as nonsocial en-
terprises. As such, social enterprises face real con-
straints to theupperlimitsof theirsocialperformance,
since social performance above FI stakeholder ex-
pectationsmay indicate that theyare reaching levels
that exceed fiscal sustainability.
Thus, when social enterprises face intense posi-
tive social performance feedback, their identity
frame of self-enhancement, which desires to in-
corporate positive feedback into firm identity, will
conflict with the strategic frame of efficiency,which
wants to mitigate rising expectations. Substantive
increases in social performance would enhance
their self-concept butwouldalsodramatically raise
future FI stakeholder expectations. On the other
hand, symbolic unrelated actions (the response of
nonsocial enterprises) would mitigate rising FI
stakeholder expectations but would not provide
desired firm identity benefits. Therefore, we sug-
gest that social enterprises will compromise by
engaging in symbolic activity that is related to so-
cial performance. For instance, a social enterprise
experiencing intense positive social performance
feedback for its new industry-advancing approach
to using recycled products may respond by issuing
a press release touting the contributions of its
worker volunteer program or the effectiveness of its
philanthropicefforts. In contrast to symbolicactions
unrelated to social performance, symbolic actions
related to social performance will not temper FI
stakeholders expectations but, in fact, will moder-
ately raise them. However, this response will re-
inforce firm identity by enhancing the social
enterprise’s own self-concept and further differen-
tiating it fromnonsocialenterpriseswithoutmaking
substantive changes that would increase FI stake-
holder expectations too dramatically. We state this
more formally in the following proposition.
Proposition 4: Social enterprises are
likely to respond to intense positive so-
cial performance feedback from FI
stakeholders with symbolic actions re-
lated to social performance.
DISCUSSION
Social performance is a pervasive topic of
public discourse and social import (Scherer &
Palazzo, 2007), but how firms approach social
performance ishotly debated (Luo&Bhattacharya,
2009; Matten & Moon, 2008; McWilliams, & Siegel,
2001). We suggest that firms neither blindly and
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selflessly pursue social performance nor coldly
and calculatedly avoid it. Rather, firms follow be-
havioral responses that involve framing effects
and identity considerations.
However, we argue that a behavioral theory of
social performance must be fundamentally dif-
ferent from its traditional financial counterpart.
The negotiation process that we propose ad-
dresses calls to build theory regarding the for-
mation of reference points, especially under
ambiguous conditions (Fang et al., 2014; Jordan&
Audia, 2012; Shinkle, 2012). In this negotiation we
extend research on strategic frames by theoriz-
ing that loss or gain strategic frames manifest,
respectively, as legitimacyandefficiency frames
in the context of social performance. Since there
are risks to being far below or far above expec-
tations, FI stakeholder social performance ex-
pectations mark a critical calibration point that
may serve as an optimal level of social perfor-
mance for firms.
Our predictions of firm responses to social
performance feedback provide an exploration
into tactics used to shape this critical point of
(potential) social performance reference point
agreement. Thus, whereas behavioral theory of
the firm grounded in financial performance con-
tends that a firm’s ideal position vis-à-vis a refer-
ence point is above it rather than below it (Cyert &
March, 1963), we contend that a firm’s ideal posi-
tion is close to a social performance reference
point (i.e., either just above or just below). In this
way a firm’s position relative to a social perfor-
mance reference point may be evaluated more in
terms of feedback intensity (i.e., minor versus
major discrepancy) than valence (positive versus
negative). While weak feedback can be tolerated
and managed more easily, it is intense feedback
in either valence that induces firm responses
(Table 1, row 6). Further, our theory expands the
strategic repertoire of firm responses beyond the
problemistic search of behavioral theory of the
firm grounded in financial performance (Gavetti
et al., 2012) and commonpredictions in the activist
literature (Briscoe&Gupta, 2016).We theorize that
firms use substantive responses to increase so-
cial performance and symbolic responses to
mitigate rising FI stakeholder expectations. In
addition, since social performance varies in im-
portance across firms, in contrast to behavioral
theory of the firm grounded in financial perfor-
mance, we contend that organizational identity
plays an important role by motivating more
distinctive responses for social enterprises rela-
tive to nonsocial enterprises (Table 1, row 5).
Our behavioral theory of social performance
also complements and extends a growing body of
literature on “wrongdoing.” Research on stake-
holder concerns (Bundy et al., 2013), scandal
(Graffin et al., 2013), university infractions
(Zavyalova et al., 2016), illegal activity (Mishina
et al., 2010), product recalls (Rhee & Haunschild,
2006; Zavyalova et al., 2012), boycotts (McDonnell
& King, 2013), and crisis (Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015;
Coombs & Holladay, 2004) has shed valuable in-
sight into how firms respond to negative evalua-
tions with a robust repertoire of defensive
strategies (McDonnell & King, 2013). We extend
this literature by examining negative feedback
from another group of salient and highly preva-
lent stakeholders—FI stakeholders. Compared to
the relatively frequently studied case of cause
identification (i.e., activism; Briscoe & Gupta,
2016), we suggest that organizational identifica-
tion creates amore intimate relationship between
the firm and its FI stakeholders, which, in turn,
incentivizes the former to act on the expectations
of the latter. Extant research has debated the
degree to which firms take seriously and re-
spond to negative social performance feedback
(McDonnell et al., 2015; Waldron et al., 2013). In-
deed, ignoring or taking symbolic actions may be
viable responses to intense negative social per-
formance feedback stemming from activists or
less salient stakeholders (McDonnell & King,
2013). However, we suggest that the salience and
close relationship with FI stakeholders requires
firms to provide substantive responses to intense
negative social performance feedback. While the
nature of the substantive responses differs be-
tween nonsocial enterprises (i.e., additive) and
social enterprises (i.e., technical), each represents
actions that increase the aggregate level of firm
social performance. As such, our theory specifies
a condition whereby firms meaningfully respond
to intense negative social performance feedback
(Waldron et al., 2013)—that is, when the source is
FI stakeholders.
Finally, in contrast to thedominantbodyofwork
in firm evaluations focused on wrongdoing, we
examine “rightdoing.” We theorize that while
positive social performance feedback confers
benefits, there are also risks associated with ex-
ceeding FI stakeholder expectations. Social per-
formance investments above FI stakeholder
expectations are unlikely to be cost effective.
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Since positive attributes are quickly integrated
into FI stakeholders’ self-concept, firms risk vio-
lating the raised standards of FI stakeholder ex-
pectations in the future. As a result, we suggest
that nonsocial enterprises, rather than resorting
to symbolic actions to mollify critics when facing
negative social performance feedback (McDonnell
& King, 2013), use symbolic actions unrelated to
social performance to temper rising FI stakeholder
expectations when facing positive social perfor-
mance feedback. However, social enterprises em-
brace positive feedback with symbolic actions
related to social performance—a decision that our
theory suggests may be unsustainable in the long
term, unless they are able to resolve conflicts with
financial performance. Our theory also contends
that social enterprises face unique social perfor-
mance feedbackdynamics. The centrality of social
performance to organizational identity and the
identified nature of stakeholders create a double
standard regarding acceptable social perfor-
mance levels relative to nonsocial enterprises. As
a consequence, social enterprises face asymmet-
rical social performance feedback such that they
are more likely to receive intense negative feed-
back than intense positive feedback. The unique
feedback dynamics of social performance de-
serves further research attention, and the concept
of performance feedback asymmetry may be use-
ful in other domains of behavioral strategy
research.
Empirical Testing
Beyond theoretical advancements, ourmodel is
conducive to exciting means of empirical testing.
Much of the research at the intersection of social
performance and evaluations has used content
analysis of annual reports, press releases, news
articles, and other media reports to capture
stakeholder evaluations and firm responses
(Krippendorff, 2012; McKenny, Short, & Payne,
2012; Short & Palmer, 2007). By culling indicators
of organizational identification, these same
sources can be utilized to focus on social
performance–related evaluations and firm re-
sponses to them. In addition, the rising corporate
use of online platforms and social media (Barnes
& Lascault, 2015) opens novel means to test our
model with a more refined focus on FI stake-
holders. While revealing social performance ex-
pectations themselves may require dedicated
interviews or surveys, stakeholders regularly
give visible and active feedback to firms through
social media, blogs, video platforms, and con-
sumer review websites. For instance, Wang et al.
(2016) analyzed London hoteliers’ responses to
consumer devaluations on TripAdvisor. Similar
stakeholder interactions are constantly playing
out on company Twitter accounts and Facebook
pages. Content analysis of these public inter-
actions can capture the prevalence of social per-
formance issues, as well as the valence (positive
or negative) and intensity (weak or strong) of so-
cial performance feedback. The direct nature of
interactions allows researchers to match firm
strategic response to specific social performance
feedback. The authenticity of these online re-
sponses could also be compared to data in annual
reports or CSR reports announcing both technical
and additive substantive firm actions.
Further, information on social media profile
backgrounds and past postings is likely to pro-
vide a rich set of content that can be used to both
distinguish between social and nonsocial enter-
prises and classify stakeholders’ organizational
identification. For instance, social enterprises
may join or “like” cause-specific groups or form
membership affiliations with other social enter-
prises online. Individual stakeholders who “like”
a firm on Facebook may be considered FI stake-
holders, and the frequency of liking posts or
favoriting tweets can provide an indication of
their level of identification. Other means to spec-
ify organizational identification include survey
scales (Bergami & Bagozzi, 2000; Dukerich et al.,
2002), alumni status (Mael & Ashforth, 1992;
Zavyalova et al., 2016), or consumer involvement
(Traylor, 1981).
Boundary Conditions and Future Research
To provide focus and depth to our theoretical
development, we have necessarily made restrict-
ing assumptions that place boundaries on our
theory. Relaxing these boundary conditions goes
beyond the scope of the current theory but may
serve as fertile ground for future theoretical de-
velopment. First, we have isolated the role of FI
stakeholders who care about social performance
because of their particular salience in expressing
social performance feedback, but, in doing so, we
have excluded other relevant stakeholders. FI
stakeholders who do not care about social per-
formance may also face identity-specific consid-
erations that motivate them to provide feedback.
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As discussed, other non-FI stakeholder groups
also provide social performance feedback, and
some have been addressed extensively in extant
social activism literature (Briscoe & Gupta, 2016).
In addition, government regulators, analysts (Luo
et al., 2015), social movements (McCarthy & Zald,
1977; Pacheco, York, & Hargrave, 2014), and info-
mediaries (Zavyalova et al., 2012) all play roles in
coordinating stakeholder feedback to social is-
sues (Schuler & Cording, 2006). We have sug-
gested that FI stakeholdersmay seek to engage or
mobilize other stakeholder groups (Waldron et al.,
2013), but further investigation of theway inwhich
the broader audience and environment influ-
ences stakeholders’ social performance engage-
ment with firms is warranted. In addition, the
firms and FI stakeholders who actively embrace
negative social performance provide a unique
context to examine potentially deviant social
performance feedback dynamics. In any case,
exploring social performance feedback dynamics
in other stakeholder groups and types of firms
would produce a more comprehensive under-
standing of both our proposed framework and
broader behavioral theory.
Second, we have argued and assumed that FI
stakeholders have relatively homogeneous
expectations regarding aggregate levels of
firm social performance. While our theory does
imply that social performance expectations
may vary depending on the level of identifica-
tion of the stakeholder, exploring potential
antecedents and consequences of differing so-
cial performance expectations among FI
stakeholders and across other stakeholder
groups is likely to be a rich avenue for future
inquiry. Social performance expectations may
vary over time, across cultural environments
(Donthu & Yoo, 1998), between industries
(Dowell, Hart & Yeung, 2000), and among
stakeholder groups (Mitchell et al., 1997). How
firms deal with heterogeneous and potentially
conflicting stakeholder social performance
feedback provides fruitful future research av-
enues that lie at the intersection of stakeholder
theory and behavioral theory. Stakeholder
theory has explored the question of “who and
whatmatters,” but we lack a full understanding
of what firms do and/or should do when multi-
ple individuals or groups that “matter” provide
conflicting feedback. This is likely a daily
struggle in large firms with elaborate networks
of stakeholders, and elucidating the processes
and consequences under such circumstances
may better equip managers to maintain and
strengthen stakeholder relations. Conflicting
social performance expectations may also stem
from diverse demands on particular issues
(Bundy et al., 2013). We isolate social perfor-
mance as a single broad criterion; however, fu-
ture research may apply a more fine-grained
examination of specific social performance is-
sues and the potential cross-pollination or spill-
over across issues.
Third, we assume that managers receive and
accurately assess social performance feedback.
However, managers may fail to receive feedback,
may misinterpret feedback, or may even actively
distort performance information (Fangetal., 2014).
This interesting consequence of ambiguous per-
formance feedback (Jordan & Audia, 2012) re-
mains fertile territory for extending our
theoretical development and integrating theories
of managerial cognition (Porac & Thomas, 1990;
Porac, Thomas, & Baden-Fuller, 1989).
Fourth, our theory takes the premise that social
performance is ambiguous and lacks clear
benchmarks. However, this is likely to change as
social performance becomes institutionalized
and reliable benchmarks are developed. While
government regulations certainly may provide
a baseline, there are also a growing number of
efforts to measure and quantify social perfor-
mance more explicitly (Delmas, Etzion, & Nairn-
Birch, 2013). As these indicators become adopted
and used by firms, they may serve as useful ad-
ditional social performance referents. At the
early stages of this institutionalization, valuable
questions include whether industry average and
historical social performance reference points
align with stakeholder feedback, how firms se-
lectively pay attention to multiple sources of so-
cial performance feedback, and how firms
calibrate responses to a new and emerging
benchmark. A related and practically useful
stream of research would focus on how to calcu-
late and disseminate such reliable and clear
benchmarks. Recent work has been directed at
the related issue of quantifying social value
creation (Kroeger & Weber, 2014; Lingane &
Olsen, 2004), yet this research is still in its in-
fancy. Should scholars succeed in creating a re-
liable and clear social performance metric that
reflects stakeholder expectations, this would
greatly aid practitioners in making social in-
vestments and decisions.
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Fifth, we isolate social performance as a refer-
ence point criterion and essentially focus on the
treatment of multiple referents (firm actual perfor-
mance and FI stakeholder expectations); however,
firms also calibrate decision making across multi-
ple goals (Cyert & March, 1963; Ethiraj & Levinthal,
2009).Weembed logic of attention to financial goals
in firm concernswith legitimacy and efficiency, but
further exploration of how firms manage social
performance goals alongside multiple financial
and survival goals is likely to be generative for fu-
ture theorizing (Arora & Dharwadkar, 2011; Greve,
2008; March & Shapira, 1992). This is likely to be
particularly valuable for social enterprises given
that they are, by definition, focused on both social
and financial goals, which may conflict or be mu-
tually reinforcing. In fact, all enterprises vary in the
relative weight they place on social compared to
financial goals, and future research would benefit
from exploring a more comprehensive continuum
of socially oriented enterprises. Indeed, managers
of all firmswould be aided by a fuller accounting of
strategies to manage financial and social tensions
or exploit potential synergies.
Finally, we develop a framework based on one
round of negotiations between FI stakeholders
and the organization. However, it is important to
realize that this model is iterative in nature,
whereby FI stakeholder social performance ex-
pectations may undergo large changes and have
little temporal stability. Firm responses to social
performance feedback are likely to become dy-
namic inputs that update FI stakeholder expec-
tations or the level of firm social performance.
This contrasts with the relatively stable and in-
cremental annual adaptation of historical and
industry peer financial reference points in most
empirical testing (Shinkle, 2012). However, further
theorizing is necessary regarding the effective-
ness of firm responses and longer-term adapta-
tion of social performance reference points.
In conclusion, while social performance is in-
creasingly important, how firms integrate it into
strategic decision making is not well understood.
We theorize that firms attempt to negotiate a so-
cial performance reference point with their highly
identified stakeholders, and we explicate re-
sponses to social performance feedback through
the use of strategic and identity frames. In doing
so we wish to open new avenues of theoretical
development regarding how social performance
is incorporated into the strategic behavior of
contemporary firms.
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